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The Challence of Assuring Universal
Service in a Competitive Environment:
What the Experience of the United States Might Suggest to Mexico
By Richard McKenna'
I. Introduction.
Telecommunications, one of the fastest growing industries in the world today, is
considered a keystone element in a modern economy.2 In order to assure the flow of
investment and efficient managment of this critical activity, many nations are turning to
privatization of their telecommunications industries. Part One of this article addresses
the experience of the United States, where telecommunications along with other "public
utility" services generally have been in private hands from the outset, and where a central
element in federal policy is now both an increase in competition and a decrease in regula-
tion. The experience might provide some guidance for Mexico, addressed in Part Two of
this article, where the move to privatization is well under way.
A particular aspect common to both nations is that Mexico and the United
States have vast areas that are lightly populated. 3 Both nations, then, must face the ques-
tion: How can a competitive approach to telecommunications be integrated, while assur-
ing that efficient service is provided to the entire nation?
1. The author is an attorney who, for the past twenty-four years, has been employed by GTE
Service Corporation to furnish counseling and advocacy to GTE's domestic telephone operat-
ing companies with specific reference to the FCC. The author would like to express his appre-
ciation to Ms. Donna Thayer of the Student Editorial Staff for her assistance with the portion
of this article pertaining to Mexican telecommunications law.
2. Larry Irving, Janet Hernandez & Wendy C. Chow, Essay: Steps Toward a Global Information
Infrastructure, 39 FED. COM. L. J. 271, 274 (1994).
3. Id. at 278. At the end of 1992, more than fifty countries across the globe had less than one tele-
phone per one hundred people. Additionally, approximately fifty million people are on official
waiting lists for telephone lines.
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II. United States.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, signed into law by President Clinton in
February of 1996 (the "1996 Act"), proposes to open the telephone network to competi-
tion nationwide while eliminating unnecessary government regulation. This is the culmi-
nation of more than twenty years of history during which the model for telecommunica-
tions service in the United States has been converted from what was assumed to be a nat-
ural monopoly to what is expected to be a universe of highly competitive firms.
Among other things, the 1996 Act 4 delineates a Universal Service 5 program
designed to assure that basic telecommunications are furnished throughout the United
States. In addition, it provides for special services or special rates to benefit medical ser-
vice providers, schools and libraries.6 Following is a brief review of the background of
telecommunications, which discusses the statutory mandate currently being addressed by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
A. THE OLD WORLD.
A primary concern with transitioning to a purely competetive environment is
the possibility of firms engaging in what is known as "cream-skimming." Cream-skim-
ming occurs when firms cluster their resources in order to serve only the more profitable
sectors, while leaving unserved (or underserved) areas of dispersed populations, as well as
areas where the provision of service is unusually costly, or areas where the population
lacks the means with which to purchase service.
4. All statutory section references in this essay are to title 47 United States Code unless otherwise stated.
5. The 1996 Act makes only one change in the Universal Service mandate adopted in 1934: insert-
ing the phrase "without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or
sex..." so the § 151 provision authorizing the FCC now reads: "For the purpose of regulating
interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available,
so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, without discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid efficient, nationwide, and world-wide wire
and radio communications service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the pur-
pose of national defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the
use of wire and radio communication, and for the purpose..."
6. 47 U.S.C. § 254 (1996), reprinted herein as Appendix I.
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In the Old World, this problem was resolved by telephone companies serving as
common carriers7, or more specifically as what is termed Carriers of Last Resort
(COLRs). Such COLRs are common carriers legally committed to serving all customers
within an identified area.8 Under this arrangement, telephone companies were given a
sanctioned monopoly in exchange for undertaking COLR obligations, while state regula-
tory agencies exercised prescribed powers of regulation over COLRs to ensure against
abuse of monopolies to the disadvantage of the public. In the case of interstate and inter-
national service, common carriers were subject to regulation by the FCC under Title II of
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. 9
A dominating factor in this Old World was a vast company known as the Bell
System, or informally as Ma Bell. The Bell System owned local telephone companies
serving more than eighty percent of the population, while its Long Lines division provid-
7. "Common Carrier" as defined in the Communications Act is essentially circular: "The term
'common carrier' or 'carrier' means any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in inter-
state or foreign communication by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission
of energy, except where reference is made to common carriers not subject to [the
Communications] Act ... ; but a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as
such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier." 47 U.S.C. § 153(10). "[R]eviewing
courts have fashioned the following two-part test for common carriage: '[T]he primary sine
qua non of common carrier status is a quasi-public character, which arises out of the undertak-
ing to carry for all people indifferently. This does not mean that the particular services offered
must practically be available to the entire public; a specialized carrier whose service is of possi-
ble use to only a fraction of the population may nonetheless be a common carrier if he holds
himself out to serve indifferently all potential users...' [and:] 'A second prerequisite to common
carrier status [is] ... that the system be such that customers transmit intelligence of their own
design and choosing." Southwestern Bell TeLCo. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(citations omitted).
8. The focus of this essay is investor-owned companies. In addition, more than 1.5 million access
lines in the United States are served by cooperatives. Among government-owned companies
are Puerto Rico Telephone Company, owned by the Commonwealth, and in Alaska, the
Municipality of Anchorage d/b/a/ Anchorage Telephone Utility.
9. At the federal level, regulation of common carriers has proceeded for sixty-two years under the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the "Communications Act"), 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
Comparable regulatory regimes have been established in each of the fifty states as well as other ter-
ritories comprising the United States of America. Under the Communications Act, common carri-
er regulation is governed by Title 11, 47 U.S.C. §201 et seq. This includes regulation of carrier rates
under §201, applying prohibitions against unfair discrimination under §202, regulating carrier tar-
iffs under §§203-205, regulating carrier facilities under §214, and regulating carrier depreciation
and accounting under §220. To the extent common carriers, broadcasters or others who make use
of the radio spectrum, this is regulated by the FCC under Title III of the Communications Act,
§301 etseq. The courts have also recognized ancillary jurisdiction of the FCC under Title I §151 et.
seq. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177-178 (1968). The 1996 Act does not
replace the Communications Act; it makes large and small additions - notably a mass of entirely
new provisions added at the end of Title II - and makes many modifications.
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ed on an essentially monoply basis the country's interstate telephone service and much of
its intrastate long-distance telephone service.1 0 The local telephone companies serving
the remainder of the population were owned by a variety of independent firms and thus
were known as Independents. 1 ' Rivalries existed between the Independents and the Bell
System but there was little or no direct competition, since each local firm possessed the
exclusive right to provide service in its certificated geographic area.
The lack of competition in intrastate and interstate service made it relatively
simple to guard against cream-skimming. Regulators and companies together set prices
so that the financial needs of the firm were met on an overall basis without closely relat-
ing costs to customers. For regulators, the point of greatest sensitivity was ensuring that
charges to residential customers would be perceived as reasonable, inasmuch as residen-
tial customers were numerous and, when aroused, capable of voting out of office either
the regulators themselves or the political forces that appointed them.
This concern resulted in practices at the state level whereby business customers
would be charged more than the cost of service in order to fund lower rates for residential
customers. At the federal level, a complicated scheme was set up that essentially over-
charged interstate customers relative to cost. The surplus was then in effect transferred to
the benefit of the residential ratepayer. 12 However peculiar the long-term economic con-
sequences of this plan, it was politically necessary. But the plan required a closed system
where benefits could be transferred for political reasons without fear of competitors tak-
ing advantage of the resulting disparities between cost and price.13
10. The corporate entity was American Telphone and Telelgraph Company, known as AT&T. I
avoid using that name here because of confusion with the later Interexchange Carrier known
as AT&T.
11. It did not escape the attention of the telphone pioneers that telephone service profitability is
directly related to population and traffic density. It is a fair generalization that what had been
the populaton and traffic centers of the country in the first couple of decades of the twentieth
century came to be served by the Bell System, while much of the remaining area of the United
States was served by independents. Some of these Independent locations subsequently became
important centers of population and traffic density.
12. Much of the history here summarized is addressed in Richard McKenna, Pre-Emption Under
the Communications Act, 37 FED. COMM. L. J. 1, 18-52 (1985), which was cited by Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court in Louisianna Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355,
369-370, 372 (1986). For a discussion of this case, see Richard McKenna, Preemption Reversed:
The Supreme Court's Decision in Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC, 39 ADMIN. L. REv.
43(1987).
13. In the Old World, even the Supreme Court emphasized the non-competitive nature of the
industry. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 91, 93, 97 (1953). The Court reject-
ed the notion of a national policy in communications favoring competition "without careful
qualification." The Court noted the comprehensive regulatory scheme of the
Communications Act, holding that the FCC, in authorizing a competitor, "must at least war-
rant, as it were, that competiton would serve some beneficial purpose such as maintaining
good service and improving it.'
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B. CHANGING THE OLD WORLD.
By the late 1960's, however, a new spirit was under way. After the Supreme
Court upheld the FCC's assertion of jurisdiction over cable television based on the
agency's ancillary powers, 14 the agency precluded telephone companies from providing
cable television service,14a and opened the way for non-telephone company vendors to
furnish terminal equipment. 15 Major barriers to the operations of Long Lines' competi-
tors crumbled in the 1970s. 16 In due course, the courts would uphold the FCC opening
the terminal equipment market even more broadly to competition by requiring tele-
phone companies to unbundle and deregulate Customer Premises Equipment. 17 The
courts also approved FCC action requiring that "Enhanced Services" be unbundled and
deregulated, and in the case of the Bell System companies, furnished by an entirely sepa-
rate subsidiary.
18
These developments were interwoven with prosecution by the United States
Department of Justice of its antitrust case against the Bell System, which led to the disas-
sembly of that system in 1984 under the terms of the "Modified Final Judgment" or
"MFJ."19 Essentially what had been Long Lines - shorn of its local service affiliates -
now became under the new terminology an Interexchange Carrier ("IXC") known as
AT&T. Seven separate Bell Operating Companies continued to provide service under the
severe restrictions of the MFJ. Many of these restrictions - especially the exclusion of
the BOCs from furnishing "intraLATX' 2 0 service - are to be eliminated in due course by
virtue of the 1996 Act.
Common carriers not undertaking COLR obligations and accordingly not cer-
tificated as such at the state level have generally been treated by the FCC as non-dominant
and thus excused from the detailed and burdensome federal regulation 2 ' that applies to
14. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177-178 (1968).
14a. But see § 302.
15. The FCC overcame the resistance of state commissions to its policy that vendors other than the
telephone company would have the right to furnish terminal equipment to customers. North
Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976). And
it created a set of interconnection standards (today embodied in 47 C.F.R. § 68.01 et seq.)that
would permit outside vendors to offer their equipment for use in the network. North Carolina
Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
16. MCI v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978), compliance
directed, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978).
17. Computer and Communications Industry Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir 1982).
18. Id.
19. United States v. AT&T, 552 F.Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
20. LATA stands for "Local Access Telecommunication Area".
21. The 1996 Act eliminates the doubts addressed in AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 509 u.s. 914, 113 S.Ct. 3020 (1993), about the extent to which the agency may suspend
or eliminate Title II requirements as to various categories of common carrier; now the FCC
has under § 160 a broad power to forbear from imposing unnecessary regulation.
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telephone companies. 22 In the case of intrastate communications, common carriers are
subject to regulation by administrative agencies authorized under state statute; the impact
of such regulation often varies greatly as between IXCs and incumbent LECs.
23
Jurisdictional conflicts between federal and state authorities have been legion and are a
dominant theme in much of the history recounted supra.
The elimination of the closed non-compitetive world meant that it was no
longer feasible to transfer the equivalent of funds back and forth among different services
and jurisdictions to meet purely political objectives. A stop-gap system adopted in the
early 1980s funded the cost of service to the residential customer by (i) a federal charge
against all customers and (ii) charges against IXCs. 24 But over the long term, this would
not suffice because in a competitive world, where the price of a particular service is inflat-
ed to generate the funds for this cross-subsidy process, competitors will seize this oppor-
tunity to force out surplus profits. Thus, surplus generated on long-distance interstate
and intrastate service - services now subject to heavy competitive pressures by aggressive
IXCs, including AT&T, MCI and a great many others - would no longer be available to
fund lower prices for residential customers.
The 1996 Act accelerates the development of this problem by seeking to assure
completely competitive telecommunications at all levels. Recognizing this problem, § 254
of the statute charges the FCC, in conjunction with a federal-state joint board, 25 to develop
a workable plan that will assure Universal Service throughout the nation.
The Act sets out certain "principles" in §254(b) and definitions in § 254(c). The
core of the statutory scheme is set forth in §254(d), which says all carriers furnishing inter-
state telecommunications services "shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory
basis, to the specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms established by the [FCC] to
22. Without getting lost in the intricacies of terminology, it suffices to say that a Carrier of Last
Resort or COLR, known as a telephone company in pre-1984 terminology, a Local Exchange
Carrier or "LEC" in pre-1996 terminology and an "incumbent LEC" under the terminology of
the 1996 Act are equivalent concepts.
23. While the sweep of federal and state utility regulation is broad, firms functioning as common
carriers are private enterprises, not branches of the government. Utility rate regulation in the
United States is governed by long-standing constitutional principles reiterated by the Supreme
Court in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989), and discussed at length in Richard
McKenna, The Special Constitutional Status of Public Utility Regulation: From Munn to
Duquesne Light, 21 U. WEST L.A. REv. 31 (1990). The nub of these principles is that the courts
will not permit confiscation of the utility investor interest under the guise of regulation. As to
whether the court will apply this principle to regulation imposed on firms that are not public
utilities, see Richard McKenna, Paradox, Asymmetry, and Switcheroos: Approaching
Constitutional Law from an Unexpected Angle, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 333 (1990).
24. NARUC v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985).
25. Under § 410(a), a joint board is comprised of members nominated by the states and members
nominated by the FCC; it has the duties and obligations of an administrative law judge, and
issues a recommended decision. Final action is taken by the FCC.
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preserve and advance universal service" 26 In effect, all carriers are required to support
service to cost-intensive customers by contributing to a common fund to be allocated
among the carriers that provide service to those customers. Thus, Universal Service is
funded not by the U.S. Government, but by industry money employed under a scheme to
be developed and implemented by the FCC in cooperation with the states.
Perhaps hoping to avoid the extended controversies between the FCC and the
states that have bedeviled policy in the past, Congress provides in §254(f) that a state
may, but is not required to, adopt regulations not inconsistent with the FCC's rules to
preserve and advance Universal Service. 27 A state plan would be funded by carriers pro-
viding intrastate services, and it must not "rely on or burden Federal universal service
support mechanisms.
"2 8
The Universal Service statute also furnishes benefits specifically addressed to
schools, libraries and health care providers. Section 254(h)(1)(A) provides that, upon a
bonafide request, carriers shall furnish telecommunications services necessary for provid-
ing health care services at rates reasonably comparable in rural areas to those charged in
urban areas. Section 254(h)(1)(B) requires discounts for telecommunications services to
schools and libraries. Universal Service support is to be made available for both of these
purposes.
One of many proceedings initiated by the FCC to implement the 1996 Act is
entitled Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service.29 In this proceeding the FCC, in
compliance with the time limit specified in § 254(a)(2), promptly issued its Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and Order Establishing Joint Board (the "D.96-45 Notice"). 30
Under § 254(a)(2) the FCC must complete this proceeding by May 1997. The D.96-45
Notice asked for comments, proposals and suggestions. On November 8, 1996, the Joint
Board released a Recommended Decision. 31 The FCC will consider this recommendation
in light of comments to be submitted no later than December 1996, as well as reply com-
ments submitted in January 1997.
26. Irving, supra note 2, at 278. "Some states are leading the way toward attaining this goal
through creative policymaking within their own boundaries. For example, New York has
developed a program that enables low-income households to receive basic service for as little as
one dollar per month plus usage charges, with installation charges as low as ten dollars. A pro-
posal to require all providers (including cable systems) to contribute toward universal service
expenses also is being considered in New york. California has established a fund to provide
telecommunications equipment and services for the deal and other with disabilities. California
also requires telephone companies to contribute toward a fund that helps low-income house-
holds receive telephone service?'
27. 47 U.S.C. § U.S.C. § 254 (f).
28. Id.
29. CCDocketNo. 96-45 (D. 96-45).
30. FCC 96-93 (released March 8, 1996), 1996 FCC LEXIS 1223.
31. Recommended Decision, D. 96-45, FCC 96J-3 (released Nov.8, 1996), 1996 FCC Lexis 6259.
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Whatever the FCC's choices, there is commonality with the underlying issues faced
by many other countries. This is particularly true in the case of countries such as Mexico
which have vast areas that are sparsely populated. However, there are also differences
between the United States and Mexico in terms of the previously recounted history and its
future implications. Interested readers should follow closely the next stage of this matter in
the United States when the FCC adopts and implements its Universal Service plan.
III. Mexico.
Mexico also is undergoing drastic changes in its telecommunications industry
and facing many of the issues now being confronted in the United States. These changes
primarily came about as a result of excessive government control and a hostile attitude
toward foreign investment.
32
Mexico shares at least one primary concern with the United States - provision
of services to outlying areas. This problem becomes apparent when looking at the statis-
tics on the number of phone lines in Mexico's different geographic regions. For instance,
Mexico City, which is Mexico's largest urban center with 24.7 percent of the population,
contains 36.1 percent of the country's total phone lines. This amounts to an average of
11.62 phone lines per one hundred people. The rest of the country averages only 6.74
phone lines per one hundred people. Since the majority of the country consists of outly-
ing rural areas, the average number of phone lines for the entire country was only 7.95
per one hundred people as of 1994.
3 3
The global trend toward privatization has seen positive results in most countries.
In Chile, for example, prior to privatization the number of main telephone lines increased
at a rate of 25 percent per year. Since privatization, the increase has exceeded 75 percent
annually. Similar results were achieved in the United Kingdom. There, households using
telephone service rose from 78 percent in 1984 to 90 percent in 1994.34
32. Brent Lee Vannoy, Comment, Mexican Telecommunications: Privatization and NAFTA Open the
Door for U.S. Expansion Into Mexican Markets, 17 HOuS. J. INTL. L. 309, 311 (Winter 1994). In
1970 the Mexican government under the control of President Luis Escheverria Alvarez began
restricting foreign investment and took direct control over much of the economy. For
instance, the government now determines the exchange rate, prohibited foreign involvement in
certain areas such as insurance, limited foreign ownership in some industries such as mining,
and prohibited foreign participation in financial services.
33. Edward Czarnecki and Andrea Katz, The Rural Dilemma: Private Investors are Crucialfor Rural
Telephones in Latin America, LATINFINANCE, 73 (July/Aug. 1996).
34. Irving, et al., supra note 2 at 274.
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A. BACKGROUND OF MEXICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS.
Although Mexico does not share historical development similar to that in the
United States, several results can be compared. In 1972, the Mexican government took
control of the telecommunications industry through a government controlled entity
called Telefonos de Mexico S.A. de C.V. (Telmex). At that time, the system was inefficient
and outdated, and had a difficult time controlling its costs. Notwithstanding the scarcity
of phone lines nationwide, twenty percent of Mexico's phones were not functioning at
any given time, and the waiting period for new service exceeded six months. 37 Internal
funding, as well as loans from foreign government credit agencies and multilateral banks,
has proven insufficient to provide telecommunications in Mexico's outlying rural
areas.
3 6After several years of continuing decline, advances in technology and global eco-
nomic pressure began to change Mexico's attitude toward privatization - not only in the
telecommunications industry but in its entire economy. These advances pointed out to
the public the need to provide a more efficient system that would be more responsive to
consumer needs.
3 7
However, the government wanted to ensure that privatizing the telecommuni-
cations industry, and introducing competition, would not make it more difficult to pro-
mote universal service.38 For instance, privatization and competition increases the risk
that providers will engage in cream-skimming. Thus, it was believed that establishing a
purely privatized system without conditions would violate an important objective of
Mexico's telecommunications law: to promote adequate social coverage with better prices,
diversity and quality, while developing a healthy competition among telecommunication
service providers. 39
35. Vannoy, supra note 32, at 312. The system had deteriorated so badly that fax machines were
virtually non-existent in 1989.
36. Irving, supra note 2, at 72.
37. Vannoy, supra note 31, at 314.
38. Czarnecki, supra note 33, at 73. Previously, rural services were financed from revenue from the
more profitable activities just as was the case in the United States. It was customary for rev-
enue to be transferred from international and domestic long distance services to ensure provi-
sion of services in rural areas that are much more costly. In a number of countries, support for
rural telecom development has taken the form of subsidies to the dominant network opera-
tors. Normally, the subsidy is paid by the general customer base and applied to the cost of pro-
viding services in high cost areas.
39. Telecommunications Act, art. 7. Article 7 states, "The objective of this Law is to: foster the effi-
cient development of telecommunications; exercise the State's authority over telecommunica-
tions in order to guarantee national sovereignty; develop healthy competiton among telecom-
munication service providers so that they can provide users with better prices, diversity and
quality; and promote adequate social coverage.'
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A critical factor in the push for privatization was a desire to stimulate the econo-
my40 The government began to realize that the economy and the telecommunications
industry functioned in a symbiotic relationship - if the telecommunications industry
could be improved it would provide a much needed boost to the Mexican economy,
which in turn would contribute further to improvements in telecommunications. 4 1
Privatization was intended to improve services offered to Mexican citizens and
businesses. Both the rural and corporate sectors suffered from the inadequacies of the
system. As mentioned earlier, rural areas were often left with minimal or no service at all
and businesses were often left without the means to perform the most basic transactions.
The Mexican government believed that privatization was the only way to improve services
to both the rural and urban areas. 4 2
There could be no justification for continuing with the present chaotic condi-
tion - largely induced by a failure to make timely investments - when Mexico's enor-
mous market and high demand was very attractive to investors. When Telmex was finally
offered publicly, investors aggressively purchased as many shares as they could acquire.
43
International leaders also encouraged Mexico to privatize the industry., believing
that government-run enterprises were less desirable than their more efficient privately-
owned counterparts. Both developed and developing countries had begun to recognize that
private investment and competition are crucial to telecommunications development. In the
last decade, more than a dozen countries have privatized their telecommunications sectors,
and at least as many are expected to begin privatization within the next five years.4 4
Technology advancements also played a role in the move toward privatization.
Many companies were installing private networks that were relatively inexpensive and
offered superior quality services. Therefore, the government realized that for Mexico to
have any financial return from its telecommunications industry, the government-run
enterprise must be sold.
45
Mexico authorized the sale of Telmex in December 1990. A controlling interest
in the voting stock of Telmex was authorized for sale to a consortium consisting of
Southwestern Bell, Groupo Carso of Mexico and France Telecom. 4 6 Southwestern Bell
and France Telecom planned expenditures totalling US $13 billion to make Telmex the
premier telecommunications provider of Latin America.47
40. Vannoy, supra note 32, at 314. One of the first steps toward privatization came with the elec-
tion of President Carlos Salinas de Gotari in 1989. With Gotari's election came the Mexican
government's new perspective that telecommunications privatization was essential to revitalize
the economy.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 315.
43. Id. at 316. Telmex sold 1.5 billion shares in the U.S., Europe and Asia.
44. Irving, supra note 2, at 274.
45. Id. The same qualities that make the private networks attractive - inexpensiveness, mobility
and ease of installation - also made them difficult to regulate and tax.
46. See David Drez, Comment, Direct Foreign Investment in Mexico's Telecommunications Market,
infra at 116.
47. Vannoy, supra note 32, at 317.
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Despite the transition, the government retained substantial regulatory powers over
the industry. The Mexican regulatory system has been called the best in Latin America. This
regulatory structure allows Mexico to support complex international communications, while
promoting universal service to markets that otherwise would be unserved or underserved.48
B. CONCERNS WITH PRIVATIZATION.
With the newly privatized industry, Mexico now faces many of the same regula-
tory issues as the United States. The government must balance the interests of investors
against the need for broader, more reasonably priced service. 49
As mentioned previously, the Mexican government was concerned with ensuring
that basic services are provided even to unprofitable rural areas - the same problem
addressed by the United States under the 1996 Act. Rural telephone access is one of the
most difficult problems facing the telecommunications industry worldwide. 50
To ensure universal service, Mexico reached a concession arrangement with
Telmex's private interests that required an enormous amount of revitalization to the
telecommunications system. Specifically, 500,000 new lines are to be installed annually; ser-
vice was to be extended to ten thousand towns with a population exceeding five hundred;
there was to be a four hundred percent increase in the number of pay telephones; and the
system was to be digitized to provide fiber optic links between larger cities.51 Essentially,
Mexico traded the new Telmex owners government approval in return for their obligation to
provide universal service. 52
This mechanism of concession requirements imposed on a single company is
comparable to what was being done in the United States in the old world. Will Telmex
face competition that is not subject to those requirements? Will the introduction of com-
petition permit a reduction in detailed regulation of Telmex? Will it mandate such a
reduction in Telmex regulation to allow Telmex to be competitive? The experience of the
United States teaches that these kinds of questions will have to be grappled with to ensure
continuing improvement in telecommunications throughout Mexico.
48. Id. at 320. Some believe this superiority may be a result of Mexico's close proximity to the
United States and its need to interface with the U.S. system. Irving, supra note 32, at 276. The
U.S. has been eager to share their regulatory experiences with countries undergoing adjust-
ments in their telecommunications regimes. This cooperation stems from the United States'
desire to aid in the development of a global information infrastructure.
49. Vannoy, supra note 32, at 321. The government also wanted: (1) to ensure that anti-competitive
practices weren't established by providers in an effort to discourage start-up providers, (2) estab-
lish criteria for market participation, and (3) provide rules and forums for dispute resolution.
50. Czarnecki, supra note 33, at 73. The more profitable private infrastructure projects have
already been targeted by foreign investors. It will likely take additional legislative and regulato-
ry reforms, as well as innovative project financing techniques to facilitate the inflow of private
capital into rural telecommunications.
51. Vannoy, supra note 32, at 321.
52. Id. at 322.
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C. NAFTA's EFFECT ON MEXICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS.
The NAFTA is expected to provide such benefits that Mexico is projected to
become a model for other Latin American countries, with significant benefit to its priva-
tized system.53 The combination of market liberalization, growing consumer demand,
and increased infrastructure investment is expected to create a foundation for significant
growth in Mexico's telecommunications market.54
The NAFTA also requires that telecommunications regulations be reasonable
and nondiscriminatory.55 Most trade treaties only require that countries treat foreign
providers the same as they treat their own domestic providers. 56 National treatment still
allows heavy restrictions to be placed on foreign industry so long as the same restrictions
are placed on domestic industry.57
It is hoped that, as a result of the NAFTA requirements, all services currently
available in the United States will become available in Mexico within a relatively short
time. There is a substantial market for services that are available only in the United
States, and the NAFTA will allow United States providers to supply those services to
Mexico without excessive restrictions. This goes beyond the national treatment standard
and actually helps to set the telecommunications policy for each country.58
Canada and the United States also will benefit from a standardized telecommu-
nications system. Domestic and international providers should be able to anticipate what
standards will govern a given proposal, and can thereby take steps to improve service with
clear knowledge that they are in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
Regulatory agencies also will be able to ensure compatability with international rules.59
Finally, regulatory agencies will receive increased responsibility under the
NAFTA requirements. Agencies may restrict access to public networks by placing condi-
tions on licensing and the resale of licenses. They also have the power to set standards for
interfacing with networks. 60 The NAFTA regulations also allow providers to afford con-
nectivity at reasonable prices, while retaining the ability to maintain profitability, and
with the ability to provide access to areas that otherwise would be left without telecom-
munications services.61 This is particularly important considering Telmex's position fol-
lowing privatization in Mexico.
53. Id. at 324. NAFTA is expected to generate revenues of US $100 million a year for value-added
or enhanced telecommunication services.
54. Czarnecki, supra note 31, at 72.
55. North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1302(1), drafted Aug. 12, 1992, revised Sept. 6,
1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. at 605 (entered into force Jan.1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
56. Vannoy, supra note 30, at 324. National treatment means that each nationmust treat foreign
and domestic providers equally.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 325. NAFTA regulations are viewed by many as more explicit as to their requirements.
This gives foreign investors security that they will know all the requirements in advance and be
able to comply with the regulations.
60. Id. at 326.
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Appendix I
Title 47, United States Code.
47 U.S.C. § 254. Universal service.
(a) Procedures to review universal service requirements.
(1) Federal-State Joint Board on universal service.
Within one month after February 8, 1996, the Commission shall institute
and refer to a Federal-State Joint Board under section 410(c) of this title a
proceeding to recommend changes to any of its regulations in order to
implement sections 214(e) of this title and this section, including the defi-
nition of the services that are supported by Federal universal service sup-
port mechanisms and a specific timetable for completion of such recom-
mendations. In addition to the members of the Joint Board required
under section 410(c) of this title, one member of such Joint Board shall be
a State- appointed utility consumer advocate nominated by a national
organization of State utility consumer advocates. The Joint Board shall,
after notice and opportunity for public comment, make its recommenda-
tions to the Commission 9 months after February 8, 1996.
(2) Commission action.
The Commission shall initiate a single proceeding to implement the
recommendations from the Joint Board required by paragraph (1) and
shall complete such proceeding within 15 months after February 8,
1996. The rules established by such proceeding shall include a defini-
tion of the services that are supported by Federal universal service sup-
port mechanisms and a specific timetable for implementation.
Thereafter, the Commission shall complete any proceeding to imple-
ment subsequent recommendations from any Joint Board on universal
service within one year after receiving such recommendations.
(b) Universal service principles.
The Joint Board and the Commission shall base policies for the preservation and
advancement of universal service on the following principles:
(1) Quality and rates.
Quality services should be available at just, reasonable, and affordable rates.
(2) Access to advanced services.
Access to advanced telecommunications and information services
should be provided in all regions of the Nation.
(3) Access in rural and high cost areas.
18 NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas
Consumers in all regions of the Nation, including low-income con-
sumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost areas, should have
access to telecommunications and information services, including
interexchange services and advanced telecommunications and informa-
tion services, that are reasonably comparable to those services provided
in urban areas and that are available at rates that are reasonably compa-
rable to rates charged for similar services in urban areas.
(4) Equitable and nondiscriminatory contributions.
All providers of telecommunications services should make an equitable
and nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and advance-
ment of universal service.
(5) Specific and predictable support mechanisms.
There should be specific, predictable and sufficient Federal and State
mechanisms to preserve and advance universal service.
(6) Access to advanced telecommunications services for schools, health
care, and libraries.
Elementary and secondary schools and classrooms, health care
providers, and libraries should have access to advanced telecommuni-
cations services as described in subsection (h) of this section.
(7) Additional principles.
Such other principles as the Joint Board and the Commission deter-
mine are necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public
interest, convenience, and necessity and are consistent with this chapter.
(c) Definition.
(1) In general.
Universal service is an evolving level of telecommunications services
that the Commission shall establish periodically under this section, tak-
ing into account advances in telecommunications and information
technologies and services. The Joint Board in recommending, and the
Commission in establishing, the definition of the services that are sup-
ported by Federal universal service support mechanisms shall consider
the extent to which such telecommunications services-
(A) are essential to education, public health, or public safety;
(B) have, through the operation of market choices by customers, been
subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers;
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(C) are being deployed in public telecommunications networks by
telecommunications carriers; and
(D) are consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.
(2) Alterations and modifications.
The Joint Board may, from time to time, recommend to the
Commission modifications in the definition of the services that are
supported by Federal universal service support mechanisms.
(3) Special services.
In addition to the services included in the definition of universal ser-
vice under paragraph (I), the Commission may designate additional
services for such support mechanisms for schools, libraries, and health
care providers for the purposes of subsection (h) of this section.
(d) Telecommunications carrier contribution.
Every telecommunications carrier that provides interstate telecommunications services shall
contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, to the specific, predictable, and suffi-
dent mechanisms established by the Commission to preserve and advance universal service.
The Commission may exempt a carrier or class of carriers from this requirement if the carri-
er's telecommunications activities are limited to such an extent that the level of such carrier's
contribution to the preservation and advancement of universal service would be de minimis.
Any other provider of interstate telecommunications may be required to contribute to the
preservation and advancement of universal service if the public interest so requires.
(e) Universal service support.
After the date on which Commission regulations implementing this section take effect,
only an eligible telecommunications carrier designated under section 214(e) of this title
shall be eligible to receive specific Federal universal service support. A carrier that
receives such support shall use that support only for the provision, maintenance, and
upgrading of facilities and services for which the support is intended. Any such support
should be explicit and sufficient to achieve the purposes of this section.
(f) State authority.
A State may adopt regulations not inconsistent with the Commission's rules to preserve
and advance universal service. Every telecommunications carrier that provides intrastate
telecommunications services shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory
basis, in a manner determined by the State to the preservation and advancement of uni-
versal service in that State. A State may adopt regulations to provide for additional defin-
itions and standards to preserve and advance universal service within that State only to
the extent that such regulations adopt additional specific, predictable, and sufficient
mechanisms to support such definitions or standards that do not rely on or burden
Federal universal service support mechanisms.
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(g) Interexchange and interstate services.
Within 6 months after February 8, 1996, the Commission shall adopt rules to require that the
rates charged by providers of interexchange telecommunications services to subscribers in
rural and high cost areas shall be no higher than the rates charged by each such provider to
its subscribers in urban areas. Such rules shall also require that a provider of interstate
interexchange telecommunications services shall provide such services to its subscribers in
each State at rates no higher than the rates charged to its subscribers in any other State.
(h) Telecommunications services for certain providers.
(1) In general.
(A) Health care providers for rural areas.
A telecommunications carrier shall, upon receiving a bona fide request,
provide telecommunications services which are necessary for the pro-
vision of health care services in a State, including instruction relating to
such services, to any public or nonprofit health care provider that
serves persons who reside in rural areas in that State at rates that are
reasonably comparable to rates charged for similar services in urban
areas in that State. A telecommunications carrier providing service
under this paragraph shall be entitled to have an amount equal to the
difference, if any, between the rates for services provided to health care
providers for rural areas in a State and the rates for similar services pro-
vided to other customers in comparable rural areas in that State treated
as a service obligation as a part of its obligation to participate in the
mechanisms to preserve and advance universal service.
(B) Educational providers and libraries.
All telecommunications carriers serving a geographic area shall,
upon a bona fide request for any of its services that are within the
definition of universal service under subsection (c)(3) of this sec-
tion, provide such services to elementary schools, secondary
schools, and libraries for educational purposes at rates less than the
amounts charged for similar services to other parties. The dis-
count shall be an amount that the Commission, with respect to
interstate services, and the States, with respect to intrastate ser-
vices, determine is appropriate and necessary to ensure affordable
access to and use of such services by such entities. A telecommuni-
cations carrier providing service under this paragraph shall-
(i) have an amount equal to the amount of the discount treated as
an offset to its obligation to contribute to the mechanisms to pre-
serve and advance universal service, or
(ii) notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (e) of this sec-
tion, receive reimbursement utilizing the support mechanisms to
preserve and advance universal service.
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(2) Advanced services.
The Commission shall establish competitively neutral rules-
(A) to enhance, to the extent technically feasible and economically rea-
sonable, access to advanced telecommunications and information ser-
vices for all public and nonprofit elementary and secondary school
classrooms, health care providers, and libraries; and
(B) to define the circumstances under which a telecommunications car-
rier may be required to connect its network to such public institutional
telecommunications users.
(3) Terms and conditions.
Telecommunications services and network capacity provided to a pub-
lic institutional telecommunications user under this subsection may
not be sold, resold, or otherwise transferred by such user in considera-
tion for money or any other thing of value.
(4) Eligibility of users.
No entity listed in this subsection shall be entitled to preferential rates
or treatment as required by this subsection, if such entity operates as a
for- profit business, is a school described in paragraph (5)(A) with an
endowment of more than $50,000,000, or is a library not eligible for
participation in State-based plans for funds under title III of the
Library Services and Construction Act (20 U.S.C. 335c et seq.) [20
U.S.C.A. § 355e et seq.].
(5) Definitions.
For purposes of this subsection:
(A) Elementary and secondary schools.
The term "elementary and secondary schools" means elemen-
tary schools and secondary schools, as defined in paragraphs
(14) and (25), respectively, of section 8801 of Title 20.
(B) Health care provider.
The term "health care provider" means-
(i) post-secondary educational institutions offering health care
instruction, teaching hospitals, and medical schools;
(ii) community health centers or health centers providing health
care to migrants;
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(iii) local health departments or agencies;
(iv) community mental health centers;
(v) not-for-profit hospitals;
(vi) rural health clinics; and
(vii) consortia of health care providers consisting of one or more
entities described in clauses (i) through (vi).
(C) Public institutional telecommunications user.
The term "public institutional telecommunications user" means an
elementary or secondary school, a library, or a health care provider
as those terms are defined in this paragraph.
(i) Consumer protection.
The Commission and the States should ensure that universal service is available at rates
that are just, reasonable, and affordable.
(j) Lifeline Assistance.
Nothing in this section shall affect the collection, distribution, or administration of the
Lifeline Assistance Program provided for by the Commission under regulations set forth
in section 69.117 of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, and other related sections of
such title.
(k) Subsidy of competitive services prohibited.
A telecommunications carrier may not use services that are not competitive to subsidize
services that are subject to competition. The Commission, with respect to interstate ser-
vices, and the States, with respect to intrastate services, shall establish any necessary cost
allocation rules, accounting safeguards, and guidelines to ensure that services included in
the definition of universal service bear no more than a reasonable share of the joint and
common costs of facilities used to provide those services.
